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Abstract
Steganography and steganalysis are two important branches of the
information hiding field of research. Steganography methods consist in
hiding information in such a way that the secret message is undetectable
for the uninitiated. Steganalyzis encompasses all the techniques that at-
tempt to detect the presence of such hidden information. This latter is
usually designed by making classifiers able to separate innocent images
from steganographied ones according to their differences on well-selected
features. We wonder, in this article whether it is possible to construct
a kind of universal steganalyzer without any knowledge regarding the
steganographier side. The effects on the classification score of a modifi-
cation of either parameters or methods between the learning and testing
stages are then evaluated, while the possibility to improve the separation
score by merging many methods during learning stage is deeper investi-
gated.
1 Introduction
Information hiding is a recent computer science security field that focuses on the
capability to hide hidden messages in digital media like pictures or movies [2,3].
This discipline encompasses the design of algorithms, called steganographiers,
that aim at discreetly inserting secret messages into innocent like cover me-
dia, the output being called stego-content. Conversely, steganalysers are tools
that aim at detecting the possible presence of a secret message in a given doc-
ument. Available steganalysers are mainly based on ensemble classifiers that
have learned to separate between real natural images and stego contents.
Steganalyzers of the literature are usually evaluated as follows. A state-of-
the-art steganographier s is firstly chosen, while the BOSS images [1] are sepa-
rated in two sets, half of each two parts being steganographied using s. Then
the first set is used during the learning stage, while the steganalysis method is
evaluated using the second set. Such an evaluation corresponds to the particular
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situation where the warden Eve (the steganalyzer) has the knowledge of which
steganographier has been used, with which parameters (embedding payload,
etc.) In this article, we will investigate a more realistic scenario where Eve only
knows that images contain secret messages: she does not know which stegano-
graphic algorithm has been used, and the game consists of separating well orig-
inal from stego contents. More precisely, in this research work, we show what
happens when the learning stage has been realized with a wrong steganogra-
phier, and we ask whether it is useful to use more than one steganographier
during the learning stage to face this problem.
The remainder of this article is constituted as follows. In the next section,
we briefly recall the functioning of state-of-the-art steganographiers and stegan-
alyzers studied in this article. Then, in Section 3, we first investigate the effect
of a wrong assumption on the steganographier during the learning stage. In
Section 4, we wonder whether it is possible to solve this problem by mixing
more than one steganographier during the learning stage, in order to design a
kind of universal detector. Errors on payload assumption are then discussed in
Section 5. All these situations are merged in Section 6, leading to what can be
expected for operational contexts.
2 State of the art
Let us now recall some famous algorithms that will be investigated in this article.
The first next paragraph focuses on steganographiers while the second one is
about steganalyzers. Readers wanting more details about these schemes are
referred to the provided citations.
In F5 algorithm [9], the absolute value of some randomly selected DCT
coefficients is decreased by one. However, to avoid errors during decoding,
F5 algorithm skips over all the coefficients equal to +/-1 which is denoted as
shrinkage. The nsF5 [5] algorithm is introduced as a modified version of F5
by alleviating the shrinkage. HUGO [4] method, for its part, focuses on so-
called efficient SPAM features on spatial domain. Finally, in universal distortion
function J-UNIWARD [6], the embedding is performed on specific regions of the
cover objects, more precisely on texture and noisy ones, where the distortion
function is computed according to wavelet domain. This method avoid the
embedding in clean edges and smooth regions.
Ensemble classifiers have been proposed as steganalysis systems in [7]. They
are built by fusing decisions of an ensemble of simple base learners that are
inexpensive to train, leading to a steganalyzer of low complexity. To achieve this
goal, these schemes explored several different possibilities for the base learners
and fusion rules for designing the final classifier. This latter has been improved
in CC-PEV, whose functioning is detailed in [8].
2
3 Training and testing stages use not the same
steganographier
Let us first measure the effects of modifying the steganographic method between
the training and the testing stage. To investigate this question, 2, 000 original
JPEG images have been used in our experiments. They are taken from the
BOSS contest [1], their size is equal to 512× 512, and they have been converted
to JPEG. For stego images, an embedding payload of 0.1 is used. The method
used for extracting the features from the images is CC-PEV. The same ensemble
classifier has been used both in the training and in the testing stage, namely
the one of [7].
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(a) nsF5 for training, and J-UNIWARD for testing
False positive rate
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
ROC
AUC = 0.5413
(b) The converse
Figure 1: The steganographier used during the training stage is not the good
one.
In the first experiment, the ensemble classifier is trained using 50% of the
natural images and 50% of the same images steganographied by nsF5, while it
is tested using the same rate of natural and J-UNIWARD images. Conversely,
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in the second set of experiments, J-UNIWARD is used during the training stage
and nsF5 during the testing one. Obtained results are presented in Figure 1. It
can be seen that the presence of J-UNIWARD hidden messages is more or less
detected when the steganalyzer has been trained by using nsF5. Conversely, the
detection of nsF5 is impossible when learning with J-UNIWARD. This asym-
metric behavior may be explained by the fact that the use of nsF5 affects more
the general aspect of the embedding image compared to J-UNIWARD. So, the
ensemble classifier can learn more from the former than from the latter, and
its classification is thus more efficient and trustworthy. This result has been
obtained again when considering all other possible combinations, see Table 1:
the only acceptable performances are obtained when nsF5 is used during the
training stage.
Learning stage Testing stage A.U.C. A.T.E
nsF5 J-UNIWARD 0.7377 0.3569
J-UNIWARD nsF5 0.5426 0.4675
nsF5 HUGO 0.7523 0.3345
HUGO nsF5 0.5371 0.4737
J-UNIWARD HUGO 0.5122 0.4912
HUGO J-UNIWARD 0.5077 0.4915
Table 1: Errors when choosing the learning steganographier
4 Trying to improve steganalyzer score by mix-
ing learning steganographiers
In this new scenario, we wonder whether the steganalysis performance can be
improved by using more than one steganographier during the learning stage:
if two or three steganographiers are suspected by Eve, can she use such a sus-
picion to produce a more accurate steganalyzer ? Or, to say this differently,
is it possible to create a kind of universal steganalyzer by using a large set of
steganographiers during the learning stage ?
Results of these experiments are given in Table 2 and partially illustrated in
receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves of Figure 2. In this table, each
row corresponds to an experiment where more than one steganographier has
been used during the learning stage. Each tuple in this table gives the proportion
of, respectively, natural images, HUGO, J-UNIWARD, and nsF5 stego-contents
that has been used to constitute the set of 2,000 images, either during training or
during testing stage. A payload of 0.1 has been used as previously. However, the
area under the curve (AUC) obtained here never becomes larger than 0.7, while
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Learning stage Testing stage A.U.C A.T.E
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 0, 0, 50) 0.6899 0.3584
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.6097 0.4269
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.6133 0.4284
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 0, 0, 50) 0.6914 0.3518
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.5104 0.4920
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.5208 0.4855
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 0, 0, 50) 0.5415 0.4692
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.6039 0.4306
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.6158 0.4149
(50, 25, 25, 0) (50, 25, 0, 25) 0.5404 0.4718
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 25, 25, 0) 0.6072 0.4303
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 25, 25, 0) 0.6585 0.4199
(50, 25, 0, 25) (50, 0, 50, 0) 0.6095 0.4311
(50, 0, 25, 25) (50, 50, 0, 0) 0.6321 0.4155
Table 2: Study of accuracy by mixing various steganographiers when training.
Each tuple represents the respective percentage of natural images, HUGO, J-
UNIWARD, and nsF5 stego-contents.
it was the case in Table 1, setting at naught the hope to constitute universal
steganalyzer by mixing several tools when training.
5 Uncertainty effects regarding payload
The objective is now to emphasize the possible effects of payload ignorance on
steganalyzer performances. Indeed, a large payload of 0.1 is always chosen for
evaluating steganalyzers of the literature. By doing so, steganalyzer designers
made strong assumptions that make life less complicated, and the game totally
unfair in their own advantage. These two assumptions are that the steganogra-
phier will absurdly use a very large payload, and additionally this payload is
known by the steganalyzer. Everything happens as if steganalyzer designers
claim to be able to detect if a communication channel possibly contains stego
images, while they finally answer to the challenge: “knowing the set of images,
the presence of hidden information, the steganographier, and the payload, can
we separate with a good accuracy the natural from the stego images.” On our
side, we argue that it is not possible to expect exactly the payload value chosen
5
False positive rate
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Tr
ue
 p
os
itiv
e 
ra
te
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
ROC
AUC = 0.6095
(a) In the training stage: 1000 natural images, together
with 500 nsF5 and 500 HUGO stego-contents. In the
testing stage: 1000 natural and 1000 JUNIWARD.
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(b) In the training stage: 1500 natural + 1500 JUNI-
WARD, while in the testing set: 500 natural and 500
JUNIWARD
Figure 2: Mixing various steganographiers in the learning stage.
by the steganographier in operational contexts.
In this new run of tests, images are steganographied by using respective
payloads of 0.005, 0.05, and 0.1 (see Figure 3 to understand the effects of such
payloads on host contents). CC-PEV features are used with ensemble classifier
in both training and testing stages. nsF5, J-UNIWARD, and HUGO have been
successively tested using the 3 payloads listed above, to illustrate the effects of
such an error for both spatial and frequency embedding. Obtained results are
summarized in Table 3. As can be seen, the only situation where the separation
is acceptable is the nsF5 one, and when training with a large payload that helps
the ensemble classifier to learn the embedding effects.
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Figure 3: Differences between host content with nsF5 when payload is respec-
tively equal to 0.1 or 0.005.
6 Operational contexts
We now consider the most realistic scenario where the steganalyzer side only
knows that one of the 3 most famous steganographier tools are used. But he
is not sure about the chosen payload. Obtained results when mixing both the
steganographier and its payload between training and testing stages have then
been computed, and obtained results are summarized in Table 4.
As can be deduced from this table, the classification is acceptable only when
the learning process has been realized with nsF5 and with a larger payload
than the one that has been used during the tests. In this situation, it has been
possible to separate, with a medium accuracy, images steganographied by either
HUGO or J-UNIWARD. Remark that, obtained results are better than what
has been found in Table 3.
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Figure 4: Train with nsF5 with a 0.1 payload and test with J-UNIWARD with
a 0.005 payload
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Train Test A.U.C A.T.E
nsF5 0.1 0.05 0.7855 0.2854
0.1 0.005 0.7723 0.3195
0.05 0.1 0.6656 0.3933
0.005 0.1 0.5408 0.4717
J-UNIWARD 0.1 0.05 0.5049 0.4949
0.1 0.005 0.5091 0.4955
0.05 0.1 0.5087 0.4958
0.005 0.1 0.5035 0.4980
HUGO 0.1 0.05 0.5175 0.4898
0.1 0.005 0.5161 0.4885
0.05 0.1 0.5182 0.4867
0.005 0.1 0.5192 0.4853
Table 3: Payload error during training
7 Conclusion
This paper has focused on experiments in Kerckhoffs’s context: everything
about the used steganographic schemes, except the key, are known by steganal-
ysis systems. Thanks to a large number of experiments, we indeed have shown
that even J-UNIWARD can be detected but while learning with other stegano-
graphic tools, namely HUGO and NSF5. This is observed even if the objective
is to analyse a small payload based steganographic tool. In such a situation, it
is sufficient to set a large payload in the learning step. To learn the behavior of
a dedicated steganographic scheme, we will consider in a future work to study
why less efficient steganographic tools are more convenient than this dedicated
steganographic scheme in the learning process.
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